Great, Thanks! Now What?

This blog grew out of a question I posed during my director's philosephy introduction that he gives to all newcomers. My organization is dedicated to building Afghanistan's security forces. The projections have increased significantly in the last few months with targets for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) projected to be over 130,000 and 109,000 respectively by October, and a total increase to over 300,000 by 2011. That's a huge undertaking, and is a key to one of the three "T"s (Transition) that our leadership has touted as themes in our operations. Obviously, the goal of transition is critical to ensuring Afghans can begin to take control of their country, and enabling coalition forces to draw down and eventually leave behind what will most likely be a token force (if any) in the country.

The question I asked was, "Who is planning the transition?" It turns out, at least from what we can see at our level, there is little central control over the transition plans. Instead it's left up to individual organizations working with the ANA and ANP. This question hit me after I learned that the leading ANA communicator, Major General Ali, had seen his first computer only 5 years ago! I wondered if we (who are so heavily dependent on our automation) were training a force that could be sustained by the Afghan Government after we left, and if the influx of international aid was decreased (current aid figures are in the neighborhood of $57 billion, over 4 times the 2009 national GDP of $13.32 billion). A computer system is an energy hog, and in a country with significant power shortages this can lead to serious problems. Generators are options, but even they are costly when you consider the amount of fuel required to keep them running. What good will a computer lab do if it takes down the whole power grid? Will the systems we're contracting to build and employ here fall into disrepair as soon as the funding well dries up?

The answer is we need to ensure we're not necessarily cultivating the best forces and practices available, but the best forces and practices for Afghanistan. As my director pointed out, the Afghans need either very high (inexpensive/energy efficient/easily repaired or replaced) technology, or very low technology (proven systems that don't rely on modern capabilities). I heard a story of a contractor who installed a state-of-the-art, completely automated fuel pumping station. It allowed one person to fill a fuel truck with the push of a button from an observation tower. When the contractor returned to inspect the system a year later, he found most of the wiring/computer systems had been scavanged, and the Afghans were operating the system manually. That system probably wasn't what was best for the Afghans.

While any social scientist will argue that the state's primary function is to provide security, a country's development can't stop there. I hope that everyone working towards the transition is considering how the Afghans will operate once we leave. We need to find a way that allows them to make their system work. We can't be training them to operate our way, we need to help them develop "the Afghan way".

Oh, and by the way, we got another conex!

- This is thinking ahead in Kabul signing out